Every state needs an army, and Tajikistan is no different. In Tajikistan, the army is made up of multiple military and paramilitary branches, which all serve to protect the dictatorial regime of Emomali Rahmon from internal and external threat. This army js Rahmon’s most important tool to keep power, but also the seems to be the greatest current threat to that same power. 

History and origin of the armed forces

In most post-soviet states, the current structure of the
armed forces is based on, at least originally, Soviet armed formations. In the
Tajik SSR, the main armed formation had been the 201^st motor rifle
division, which it follows should have been the backbone of the new military of
the independent Tajikistan. Tajikistan was, however, not granted control of the
division, which remained under Moscow’s command as a Russian foreign military
installation.[1]

The 201^st had participated in the war in
Afghanistan in the 1980s, where Central Asians notably were kept away from
combat duty in favor of Slavs, especially Russians.[2]
Central Asians being segregated into non-combat and supporting roles left
Tajikistan upon independence with no army of its own and precious few soldiers
with actual combat experience to make an army.

The Tajik civil war (1992-1997) certainly deserves an
article in itself, but in this context it is important mainly as background for
the state of the armed forces today. The lack of an army proved problematic
enough that soon to be president Emomali Rahmon signed a decree to officially
establish the Tajik armed forces on February 23^rd, 1993, nine months
into the civil war.

The new armed forces were formed with a loyalist militia as
its backbone, the Popular Front of Tajikistan, Rahmon’s armed supporter group. While the first iteration of the
army was made from a single militia, it would not be the only one. With the end
of the civil war in 1997, most militias of the United Tajik Opposition would
also be folded into the Tajik military, which was from then on made up of
multiple conjoined and previously opposing militia groups.[3] This
helps explain both the military’s relative weakness and the government’s
distrust of it.  

Rahmon’s greatest fear

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon has in his 32 years in
office done little good for the Tajik nation and people. In his time in office Tajikistan
has remained a poor and underdeveloped country, with infrastructure and
institutions rarely benefitting the people outside of the capital. Internationally,
his regime has failed to resolve the border dispute with Kyrgyzstan to the
north and is still hopelessly reliant on Russian protection against the Taliban
ruled Afghanistan to the south and the ever-antagonistic Uzbekistan to the
west. By design, Rahmon’s regime is deeply authoritarian, with systemic
corruption and rampant human rights abuses.

Without being a mind reader, it is impossible to know how
much Rahmon knows about the threats to his regime, or if he is worried about
it. However, with a 32-year pattern of doing everything to stay in power, it
seems unlikely that the prospect of his regime collapsing is out of his mind. As
late as June of this year Rahmon made a series of arrests against perceived and
real opposition with the claim of a seemingly fictional coup attempt.[5] The
supposed ringleader of this coup, Saidjafar
Usmonzoda, is the recently deposed leader of the Democratic Party, which is very
much a controlled opposition party.[6] Not
even fake opposition survives in the current state of Tajikistan.  

As age catches up to him, Rahmon has been grooming his son,
Rustam Emomali, for his succession. As Rustam Emomali is deeply unpopular, and
a Tajikistan not led by Rahmon is as of now untested, the coming succession
process will likely be troubled.[7] Indeed,
the latest crackdown is speculated to be linked to Rahmon’s worry that his
turnover of power to his son will not go without issue. Rustam Emomali appears
to be more at odds with the army than his father is, and rumors abound that he
shot Saimumin Yatimov, the leader of the State Committee for National Security,
over disagreements in military policy.[8]

Whatever Rahmon’s personal stance on the threat of the
military is, there is real history in Tajikistan of insubordinate military
leaders. As far as I’ve personally found, 11 senior commanders (see below,
disgraced commanders section) of the Tajik military has either acted in armed
opposition to the government or been arrested to prevent armed opposition to
the government. In some of these cases there have been accusations that the
regime has constructed the charges to remove possible opposition, though most
regimes use accusations of corruption, not coups, to remove opponents.

Coup-proofing

The inability of disloyal commanders to seriously harm the
Rahmon regime is due to a set of design choices in the organizational framework
of the Tajik security services. For a coup to work, the organizers need a local
superiority in armed force, at the sites of power, and to convince everyone
else that the coup is really already over and that there’s no point in fighting
them.[9]

The military unit tasked with the defense of the sites of
power in Dushanbe is the National Guard, formerly known by the more fitting
name of Presidential Guard. This National Guard is directly under the command
of the president, which ensures safety in the capital as long as they remain loyal.
The leader of the National Guard, Bobodzhon Dzhamolzoda, is something of an
unknown character, unlikely to act against his patron Rahmon and unlikely to
gain support from the other and larger armed branches if he made a move.

In studies of dictatorial politics the methods dictators use
to keep their own general staffs away from their power is known as
coup-proofing. One of the more popular and effective forms of coup-proofing is
maintaining multiple overlapping security services that all have strength sufficient
to check each other.[10] Regardless
of whether or not it was intentional, Rahmon has mastered this technique. Through
a needlessly complex military organizational web, Rahmon’s government wields what
are essentially five different armies all separately answering to the
president.

Org chart of all Tajik security forces. Purely administrative
units shown in blue, major armed formations shown in green, minor armed formations
shown in purple. Relational info gathered from government websites.

Increasing militarization

With the combination of maintaining the loyalty of the National
Guard and keeping the other branches divided, Rahmon’s power is overall, as of
today, relatively secure. This might change as other considerations force him
to allow the military to grow and consolidate power. While Rahmon’s greatest
current threat might be the military, as illustrated by the 2024 coup scare, he
does also sorely need it to maintain power in other sectors. This can be a
problem as the Tajik military is not only made up of former militia and split up
into many different branches, it is also very weak, partially as an effect of
the two previous facts.

For many years the Tajik government has been able to rely on
Russian military protection, but developments during recent years have proven
that Russian protection may not be as reliable as previously thought.[11] The
Russian failure to protect Armenia should be worrying to Tajikistan, as their
alliance with Russia is regulated by the same treaty as Armenia’s. The Russian
invasion of Ukraine has already caused them to build down their capabilities in
Tajikistan.[12]

In the context of faltering Russian support and the overall
security picture in the region being hostile to Tajikistan, Rahmon has decided
to bite the bullet and strengthen the military.[13] The
buildup is monumental, from 2021 to 2024 it has risen from $80 million to $354
million.[14] A military
buildup will place more power in the hands of top commanders, unless Rahmon
keeps fracturing the forces into even more separated armed formations.

At the same time, the buildup might not be enough. A large
spending increase does not cause an equal growth in actual military strength.  Tajikistan’s rival Kyrgyzstan has made similar
increases in their spending, granted to their already more powerful military.[15]
If Tajikistan plans to keep up they will need to keep military spending at its
current amount of more than 2% of GDP for years, which will place a strain on the
country’s already underdeveloped economy.[16]

Conclusion

For now, Emomali Rahmon’s balancing act between his utilization
and distrust of the military seems to be working. As long as his health holds
and nothing major changes, he will remain in power. However, major things are
changing, and his health is not holding. In the coming years, Rahmon will have
to reckon with the implications of his own military buildup. He will also have
to find a way to give his son Rustam power to continue the family dynasty,
without angering his military staff which would allow Rustam to keep that
power. Tajik military policy is central to this continuing story.

This article was originally going to be half as long and be
about twice the number of topics. Needless to say, more articles about
Tajikistan will be posted in the future. If you’re here for other topics than
Tajikistan, don’t worry, I have other things planned.

Appendix: disgraced
commanders

These
eleven men were all at least senior commisioned officers of the Tajik military
at some point, and they have all suffered consequences for their
insubordination to Rahmon. It is unclear how many cases here are of real
opposition and how many were constructed to centralize power. This list is most
likely incomplete. There are no guarantees that all such cases reach the media,
and there are no guarantees that I’ve found all the ones the media has reported
on.

The list

Mahmud
Khudoiberdiyev, colonel. Despite fighting on Rahmon’s side he led three revolts
in 1995-1996, 1997 and 1998 against Rahmon, one Uzbek backed during the civil
war, one shortly before the end of the civil war and one shortly after.[17]
He was half Uzbek and allegedly hid in Uzbekistan, causing an international
incident. Khudoiberdiyev died in exile in 2001, though the Tajik government disputed
news of his death and kept trying to find him for years after.[18]
During the 1998 revolt he briefly captured much of the northern Sughd region, and
is to date the greatest direct threat to Rahmon’s rule since the civil war.

Yakub
Salimov, general, former minister of the interior. In 1992 he was part of the
group that decided to make Rahmon president. Allegedly helped organize coup
attempts in 1997 and 1998.[19]
Salimov was arrested in Moscow and extradited in 2003, given 15 years in prison
in 2005 and released from prison in 2016.[20]
He was again arrested in 2024, this time on claims of helping organize Usmonzoda’s
coup attempt. A few other influential politicians were also arrested, as well as
the two civil war era warlords Salamsho Muhabbatov and Nazrullo Naimov.[21] A
member of the exiled opposition claimed that a current general of the armed
forces was prepared to carry out a coup, though the truth of that statement is
up to debate.  

Mirzo
Ziyoyev, general, former emergency services minister. Went into hiding to
restart the struggle against the government, but was allegedly killed in 2009
by mafia associates. Was also allegedly captured by government forces before
his killing, leading to speculation that he was summarily executed.[25]
In the wake of his killing 46 of his associates were arrested, some of whom
participated in the same prison escape as Abdurasul Mirzoyev.[26]

Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, retired commander. Formed the
Democratic Party of Tajikistan. Accused of planning a coup and sentenced to 23
years in prison in 2005. He was transferred from prison to a penal colony in 2015,
where he probably remains today.[27] His
arrest marks the end of the Democratic Party as a serious opposition force.

Muhammadboqir Muhammadboqirov, lieutenant colonel. Removed
from his position in the border guard because his men confiscated a batch of
illegal drugs, in other words he did his job too well.[28]
After years of pestering by the regime he was killed in 2022 by government
forces without apparent reason.[29]

Tolib Ayombekov, lieutenant colonel. Implicated in the
killing of major general Abdulla Nazarov in 2012, and led the subsequent battle
against government forces that same year.[30]
He surrendered, but remained a free man until his arrest in 2022.[31]

Imomnazar Imomnazarov, retired commander. Implicated in the
killing of major general Abdulla Nazarov in 2012, but did not participate in
the following clashes on account of his poor health. He was killed by
government forces in his home during the violence.[32]

Abduhalim
Nazarzoda, major general. In 2015 his followers attacked a police station and a
defense ministry building. He fled to the countryside where he was later the
same year killed by special forces. Colonel Rustam Amakiev, leader of the Alpha
Group special force, was killed in the operation by Nazarzoda’s men.[33]

Juhaidulloh
Umarov, colonel. Was part of Nazarzoda’s group and was killed alongside him.

Gulmurod Halimov, lieutenant colonel, chief of the special
police. Left Tajikistan to join ISIS in 2015.[34] During
his time in ISIS he worked as a recruiter and eventually became their “minister
of war”, arguably reaching greater heights in the caliphate than he ever did in
Tajikistan career wise. He never returned to Tajikistan and was claimed as
killed on multiple occasions.[35] While
his 2017 death was cast in doubt, he appears to be dead by now.

Sources: