Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime just collapsed. After 24 years in power and 13 years of civil war, Assad would fall to an opposition offensive that lasted just 11 days. The opposition advances were so fast that they have forced me to do rewrites on most of the article, with Damascus falling before I was able to finish it. The original scope of this article was “Assad’s regime will fall”, and has turned into “it sure did”.
This article will answer four main questions:
How did we get here?
What just happened?
What’s next for Syria?
What’s next for the world?
The war in Syria is by no means over, with the now victorious opposition being internally divided and caught up in conflict with both Kurds and Israel.
Syrian faction one: Assad
The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) was the military of the Syrian Arab Republic, led by President Bashar al-Assad. Alternatively known as government forces, Assad-loyal forces, or simply the army.
The Syrian Arab Armed forces had a paper strength of around 220 thousand professional and militia soldiers, and was the only faction in the Syrian civil war with access to significant artillery support, armored support and air power.
How did we get here?
Bashar al-Assad has ruled Syria as president since the year 2000, when he took power following the death of his father Hafez al-Assad. Hafez had taken power in Syria through a coup in 1971, after stacking the military with members of his own Alawite minority.
Assad carried on his father’s legacy of ruling Syria with an iron fist. Arab spring protests in 2011 were met with state violence, which led to the civil war we have today. By the end of his reign, Assad would spend more time ruling a country in civil war than a peaceful one. The Syrian opposition that rose to fight Assad has struggled to form a coherent front, with liberal, Islamist, and regionalist motives all driving different parts of the opposition cause.
Syrian faction two: The Opposition
The Syrian opposition is a faction composed of multiple different groups, all with the common goal of overthrowing Assad.
The leading group in the new interim governmnent is the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) with its political wing being the Syrian Salvation government (SSG). Prior to the offensive they controlled the city of Idlib in Syria’s Northwest.
Less active is the Syrian National Army (SNA) led by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and closely linked to Turkey. They participated in the offensive against Aleppo, but are mostly opposed to the Kurds.
In the south of Syria there is the Southern Operations Room (SOR) which consists of a number of smaller groups that were reactivated during the offensive. They had entered a ceasefire with the Assad regime in 2018.
The last group is the small US-backed Syrian Free Army (SFA), which held land in the southeast prior to the offensive.
Estimates for the strength of the opposition are both varied and outdated. All four opposition groups have been bolstered by recruitment during their offensive, and their relative strength will take some time to gauge. A few years ago the SNA was without a doubt the largest group, but that is no longer certain.
The original liberal opposition failed to overthrow Assad in the early stages of the war, allowing the Islamic State to rise as a major player. The threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) caused a massive international response, which Russia used to save Assad’s government from both the stated jihadist threat and the liberal opposition.
After the collapse of ISIS during the late 2010s, the war largely stagnated, and Assad’s rule seemed largely secure. After some battles between the Syrian army and the Tahrir al-Sham, the frontlines froze in 2020, not to move for another four years. As Assad at this point controlled almost two thirds of his own country, multiple international observers were happy to declare that while the war was not officially over, Assad had in practice won it.[1]
While Assad looked strong territorially, his grip on power was vulnerable. His armed forces disproportionately recruit from his own Alawite minority, which is seen as more loyal to his rule.[2] This has created both a social crisis within the Alawite population and a reliance for the SAA on a far smaller recruitable population than they would otherwise have access to. At the same time, Assad failed to convert his military victories into making a stable state, leaving his rule unpopular with a people who has little to lose.[3]
Assad’s own shortfalls have previously been made up by the intervention of his allies. The Assad regime’s main allies are Russia and Iran, with Iranian proxies included. The most important of these Iranian proxies for Assad has been the Hezbollah, which has recently been more occupied with fighting Israel in Lebanon than it has been with supporting Assad. Russia’s own invasion of Ukraine made the prospect of renewed Russian intervention unlikely, and the limited Iranian aid to the Assad regime did indeed prove to not be enough.
With Assad not doing much to further secure his rule, the Hayat Tahrir-al Sham (HTS) was doing preparations to overthrow it. Originally an al-Qaida offshoot, the HTS has been rebranding to be seen as a legitimate member of the opposition and as a legitimate alternative to Assad’s presidency. While the HTS has been secretive about their methods and capabilities, reports have been leaking out about their increasing training and recruitment, and their increasing use of drones to combat Assad’s heavier forces.[4]
Sources:
[1] https://news.sky.com/story/syrias-neighbours-have-accepted-assad-has-won-the-war-and-hes-not-going-anywhere-12884618
[2] https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/no-homeland-no-future-alawite-youth-as-the-backbone-of-the-assad-regime/
[3] https://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/reconstruction-in-assads-syria-despite-an-exclusive-social-contract/
[4] https://npasyria.com/en/111180/
A map of the Syrian civil war as the frontlines were from March 2020 until November 2024. Map by Jusoor.
What just happened?
On the 27th of November, the HTS launched their offensive in the direction of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city. At the same time, rebels south of Damascus took up arms against government forces, reactivating the conflict in a part of Syria that has been relatively calm for years. Soon after, the Turkish-backed oppositional Syrian National Army joined the offensive on Aleppo, and the fall of the city was ensured.
The 30th division of the Syrian Republican Guard, Assad’s private elite army, was one of the first army units to disintegrate during the rebel offensive, both failing to protect Aleppo and itself.[1] This would soon become a pattern, as major armed formations within the army fell apart instead of offering meaningful resistance, either surrendering or fleeing the country.[2] Assad’s army should have been the most powerful on paper, but the collapse of some units seems to have created a cascading effect.
As the situation worsened for the government, more and more opposition groups also joined the fight against Assad. As the army was leaving large parts of the country to defend Syria’s largest cities, large swaths of land were taken by the opposition in the east without a fight.
Syrian faction three: the Syrian Democratic Forces
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a faction nominally opposed to the rule of Assad, but which has focused mainly on local democracy, local autonomy and minority rights.
The main force within the SDF is the YPG, a primarily Kurdish armed group. Because of this, the SDF are often referred as simply “the Kurds”. Their armed strength is uncertain, but is often put at around 100 thousand soldiers.
The SDF has not attempted to create a new government for all of Syria, but has instead created the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, often referred to as Rojava. The administration functions as a quasi-state, with its own governance and subdivisions. It controls most of the land east of the Euphrates, and select territories west of it.
The loss of cities and army units led to a collapse in army morale within Assad’s ranks, and the army’s emergency recruitment drive failed.[3] The opposition, on the other hand, experienced a surge in manpower as fighters from liberated areas flocked to join the offensives. Iran attempted to reinforce Assad’s ranks using militia fighters from Iraq, but it was too little too late.[4]
The end result, of course, is that Damascus fell. Assad has already left the country, and so have the armed forces of Iran and Russia that were left in Syria. With the end of the civil war in its current state as a fact, it only remains to be seen what this means for Syria and the world at large going forward.
Sources:
[1] https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2024/12/05/syrias-elite-tiger-forces-fail-to-stem-rebel-advance-in-hama/
[2]https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/12/07/syrian-troops-enter-iraq-via-al-qaim-crossing-sources
[3]https://levant24.com/news/2024/12/assad-scrambles-to-regroup-amid-recruitment-crisis/
[4]https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pro-iranian-militias-enter-syria-iraq-aid-beleaguered-syrian-army-2024-12-02/
A map of the Syrian opposition offensives. Picture from wikimedia commons.
Timeline:
The cities mentioned are all provincial capitals, of which Assad controlled 10/13 before the offensive.
November 28th:
The offensive begins. HTS forces attack east from Idlib in the direction of Aleppo.
November 29th:
The HTS reaches the outskirts of Aleppo. Major fighting begins south of Damascus.
November 30th:
Most of Aleppo is captured by the HTS. HTS forces also advance south towards Hama. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attack the Kurdish SDF’s Afrin district.
December 1st:
The HTS captures the rest of Aleppo as government forces in the city collapse. The rest of the Afrin district is captured by the SNA.
December 2nd:
The fiercest fighting in the offensive yet breaks out north of Hama. Government forces keep losing every battle.
December 3rd:
The HTS reaches the outskirts of Hama city. Iran-backed Iraqi militia fighters cross the border to support the Assad regime. Russian naval forces begin a partial withdrawal from Syria.
December 4th:
The government carries out its only successful counterattack of the campaign, recapturing a few villages around Hama.
December 5th:
Government forces in Hama withdraw south towards Homs, letting the city fall to the HTS. The Hezbollah sends limited forces across the border from Lebanon to support Assad in Homs.
December 6th:
Government forces withdraw from the entire eastern half of Syria to defend Damascus and Homs. The withdrawal prompts the Syrian Free Army to join the offensive, while the SDF attacks and captures Deir ez-Zoir in the east.
Rebels in the south capture both Suwayda and Daraa. Iran withdraws all forces from the country altogether.
December 7th:
HTS forces reach Homs, while southern rebels reach Damascus. The ghost town Quneitra being captured leaves Assad with control of four of 13 provincial capitals.
December 8th:
Homs falls to the HTS, allowing the HTS to move on an encircled Damascus. Damascus falls hours later. Bashar al-Assad resigns as president and flees to Russia.
The two remaining provincial capitals, Latakia and Tartus, are taken over by the opposition without violence.
Syrian rebels burning the tomb of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father. Picture via the BBC.
What’s next for Syria?
With Assad’s regime out of the picture, a transitional government has been put in place to rule Syria until a lasting solution can be created. This transitional government is headed by caretaker prime minister Mohammed al-Bashir from the Tahrir al-Sham.[1] Before taking over governance of all of Syria he was the prime minister of the Syrian Salvation Government which has ruled Idlib since 2017. The transitional government is planning to rule until March 1st, 2025, by which time a new system should be put into place.
Notably absent from the transitional government is Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, commonly known under his pseudonym Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. He is the leader of the HTS, and is often assumed to be the future leader of the new Syria. The decision to leave the seat of President open for the time being serves as a signal by Jolani that his coming rule is not a foregone conclusion. As the leader of the group that did most of the heavy lifting in the final overthrow of the regime, his plans will be important for where Syria ends up after this.
A wanted poster from the US department of state about al-Nusra front leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.
During the past few years Jolani has gone through a process of renewal, marking himself as more of a moderate and legitimate politician than his old Islamic militant image.[2] He was previously a member of the Islamic State, but he left it as it got bigger and more brutal. He then pledged allegiance to Al Qaida, before again breaking ties with the group in 2017. Despite having left both groups, both Jolani and the HTS as a whole are designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the US government.[3] For the transformation of Jolani to be believed internationally, he will likely have to continue his moderate rhetoric and policies for a while.
Shortly after the fall of Aleppo, Jolani held a rare interview with the CNN, providing insight into his views on Syria, Islam and politics as a whole.[4] In the interview, he spoke about how Syria should be led by institutions, not by the whims of individuals, and about how the HTS is ready to dissolve in favor of a unified Syria. Speaking of sectarianism, he pledged to respect the different sects all throughout Syria, as opposed to what Assad had done with his Alawite-focused policies. While giving these promises, Jolani had a flag with the Hashada printed on it behind him, coincidentally the same flag used by the Taliban.
Leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Ahmed Hussein al-Shaara in an interview with CNN.
The personal importance of Jolani is entirely dependent on him and the HTS actually gaining power in the new Syria. The Turkish-backed SNA is still loyal to the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), which remains as an alternative to the HTS’ transitional government. By old estimates the SNA was the most powerful Syrian opposition group, and have not yet given any signal that they’d be willing to give up their independent governance and armed forces. Turkey holds much sway over the SNA, and the future of a true all-Syria government may be as dependent on Turkish as it is on Syrian choices.
The main Syrian opposition group in exile is the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). Its president Hadi al-Bahra has spoken out about his planned transition, saying he wants an 18-month transitional period before new elections can be held.[5] If he can reach an agreement with the HTS it will grant both sides much legitimacy. The support of the SNC, as well as the southern rebel groups will be crucial for both the SNA and the HTS in crafting itself as the sole government of the new Syria. Until the smaller groups pick their sides, it is the HTS’ transitional government that sits in Damascus.
The future of the Syrian Democratic Forces
While there is no fighting between the factions of the Syrian opposition, there is fighting between the two main Syrian opposition groups and the mainly Kurdish SDF. After the SDF took control of the Deir ez-Zoir from withdrawing government forces, the HTS drove them out of the city and back to the eastern bank of the Euphrates.[6] At around the same time, the SNA attacked and captured the city of Manbij in the Aleppo governate from the SDF.[7] While Deir ez-Zoir had only been under SDF control for days, Manbij had been under SDF control since 2016 as one of the main strongholds of the group west of the Euphrates.
An armored vehicle from the SNA in the Manbij district. Picture via Anadolu.
The SDF is in a difficult spot after the fall of the Assad regime, as the groups wishing to see an end to Kurdish autonomy have no other adversary in the country to worry about. During the Turkish offensive on the SDF in 2019, Assad sent troops to protect parts of the SDF’s territory.[8] The US, as the previous guarantor of Kurdish self-rule in both Iraq and Syria has made no pledge to defend the SDF in the aftermath of the Assad regime. If the Kurdish autonomous zone is to last as an entity at all, and if the SDF is to have any part in the new Syria, they will need to give major concessions.
Amid the politics, there are talks of refugees returning home and the creation of a revitalized Syria. The country will need some time to rebuild, which may worsen the political divides, but the end of the main war will for now give some of that needed time. The humanitarian situation is the worst it has been since the beginning of the war, leaving the new government with major challenges to face.[9] Hopefully the war ends soon on all fronts, and the new rulers of Syria end up ruling better than Assad did.
Sources:
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-rebels-work-form-government-restore-order-after-assad-ouster-2024-12-10/
[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q0w1g8zqvo
[3] https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/
[4] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/06/middleeast/syria-rebel-forces-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-al-jolani-intl-latam/index.html
[5] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-opposition-leader-says-state-institutions-should-be-preserved-and-rebels-accomodated
[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/11/syria-fighters-who-overthrew-al-assad-claim-control-of-deir-az-zor
[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-democratic-forces-enarrebels-reach-us-brokered-ceasefire-agreement-manbij-sdf-2024-12-10/
[8] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-towns-report-idUSKBN1WS0K0/
[9] https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2024-humanitarian-needs-overview-february-2024-
What’s next for the world?
The fall of the Assad regime is a victory for the regime’s enemies, and a major defeat for the regime’s friends. In addition to the direct effects of the fall, the signaling effect of the collapse of a Russian and Iran-backed regime is massive, as is the signaling effect of the collapse of any state being that rapid. Among Assad’s enemies, Turkey is most likely to gain from the regime change, while long-time Assad enemy Israel seems deeply skeptical of the takeover.
Turkey
Turkey is the main partner of the SNA, as mentioned before. The relationship is so deep that the SNA is often correctly described as a Turkish proxy, with almost complete control of the group’s organization, strength and actions.[1] Not only that, but Turkey has also been the closest thing to a friend the HTS has had internationally. During a major government offensive in 2020, Turkey intervened on the side of the HTS and defeated Assad’s forces.[2] Officially this was because of an airstrike carried out against a Turkish observation post, but the result was saving the HTS from an offensive that might have otherwise destroyed the group. Turkey has further reinforced the Idlib area in the time since, serving as a sort of protector of the HTS before their victory.[3]
A man hangs the Turkish flag from the Aleppo citadel shortly after the rebel victory in the city. The image was posted on Twitter, and reposted by among others Erdoğan’s daughter.
It is not known exactly how many soldiers Turkey has stationed in Syria, but in 2020 there were reportedly 10-15 thousand in the Idlib area alone.[4] This is in the areas run by the HTS, which Turkey is not officially linked to. In the areas run by the SNA, Turkey has extended control to the point it should be called an occupation.[5] The control of the occupied zones include Turkey training Syrian police, issuing ID-cards and teaching Syrian children Turkish.
Three possible goals emerge as evidenced by Turkish policy choices and rhetoric: creating a Turkish-friendly Syrian regime, maintaining Turkish occupation in northern Syria, and destroying the SDF. None of the goals are incompatible, but going for all three at once may prove difficult for Turkish diplomats. Maintaining the Turkish occupation zone in particular would be unpopular with any new Syrian government. On the other hand, giving up some of the country to win all of it is still a win for Turkey.
A map showing the locations of Turkish military outposts and bases in northern Syria prior to the rebel offensives. Map by Jusoor.
If Syrian refugees are to return home in large numbers, as Jolani is suggesting, this will again matter most to Turkey, which houses around half of the world’s Syrian refugees.[6] The return of Syrians to Syria has previously been described as a goal of Erdoğan’s government in Turkey, and a unified Syria will help in this regard. If all refugees return to Syria, then 10% of the country’s population will have lived in Turkey. This may also end up mattering to the foreign policy of Syria in the future.
Israel
Israel seems to be neighboring country of Syria that is most bothered by the fall of Assad, despite their longstanding rivalry with the Assad dynasty. Israel is so bothered, in fact, that they launched a small war with Syria in the midst of the transition of power. Claiming it is to prevent the heavy weaponry of the Assad regime to fall into the hands of Islamists, Israel is methodically destroying all advanced Syrian military assets. Using air strikes across Syrian territory, Israel has destroyed missile storages, aircraft, armored vehicles and the entire Syrian navy.[7]
While the strikes are ongoing, Israeli forces have moved into the Syrian controlled parts of the Golan heights unopposed, taking both the Syrian side of Mount Hermon and the ghost town of Quneitra.[8] After first refusing to comment on the move, Israeli authorities have stated that the takeover is defensive in nature, and that they will stay only as long as needed.[9] Of course, “as long as needed” is up to Israeli security authorities to decide, and the takeover may become a permanent fixture that the new Syrian government has no way of changing.
Israeli soldiers on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon for the first time since 1973. Image via the Times of Israel.
Overall Israel is one of the powers to earn most from the fall of the Assad regime. Syria has been used by the Hezbollah, one of Israel’s main enemies, as both a location for many of their forces and as a supply path from Iran to Lebanon via Iraq.[10] The fall of the Assad regime leaves the Hezbollah stranded and weakened, and reduces the regional strength of Iran. Both of those forces being weakened is a boon to Israel.
Russia and Iran
The main loss for Russia is the loss of prestige. Their Syrian ally has been defeated, despite the presence of major Russian troop formations present in the country.[11] This shows a Russian inability to defend their allies in similar situations, should it be necessary. Assad’s regime held little value to Russian planning apart from its position, where Russia has both air and naval bases on the coast. Those bases are still there, but for Russia to maintain its bases in a Syria ruled by groups they’ve been fighting for years is a dubious proposition.[12] The Russian naval base in Tartus is the Russian navy’s only toehold in the Mediterranean. With that gone, the naval base in Crimea is back to being the southernmost Russian naval base outside of the Pacific.
Iran’s loss is far greater than just the prestige. The loss of Syria in its sphere makes reaching Lebanon harder, both for purposes of supporting the Hezbollah and general power projection in the country. Additionally, for the strategic planning of Iran, the loss of Syria means that the Syrian army Iran could once count on when fighting an enemy simply is not there anymore. It also means training facilities and missile factories Iran built in Syria to support Assad are gone.[13] The Iranian bloc in the Middle East is by no means destroyed, but it has been significantly reduced.
The world at large
The fall of the Assad regime does not matter much as the politics of western countries are concerned. Assad was not a major enemy of the EU or NATO, and the only effect is the weakening of Iran and Russia, the ones western leaders actually care about. The US government under Donald Trump will have to make a choice about whether to support the Kurds, a choice Trump already made in 2019.
A signaling effect the fall of the Syrian Arab Republic may have globally is as a proof yet again that an Islamist group can defeat an established state, as was shown previously in Afghanistan. Radical Islamist movements, often Salafist or jihadist movements, keep generating support around the world with those who would follow them. This is especially important in the weak coup governments of the Sahel, where Islamic State and Al Qaida linked groups often win victories against army forces.
Ultimately, the fall of the Assad regime matters most to Syria, then to the Middle East, then to the world at large, as is to be expected. The international outcome hinges on what happens within Syria, and which group ends up on top in the coming power struggle or election, whichever is first. An Islamist Syria will look different on the outside world than what a democratic federalist Syria will, and it is by no means certain which groups will participate in government.
Sources:
[1] https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2019/strategies-of-turkish-proxy-warfare-in-northern-syria/4-key-characteristics-of-turkish-use-of-syrian-armed-proxies/
[2] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/turkey-launches-operation-spring-shield-in-syrias-idlib/news
[3] https://thecradle.co/articles/turkey-establishes-military-base-in-northwestern-syria
[4] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/turkey-withdraws-from-base-in-northwest-syria-sources-say-idUSKBN274295/
[5] https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2018/08/from-afrin-to-jarabulus-a-small-replica-of-turkey-in-the-north/
[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/10/where-do-six-million-syrian-refugees-live-today
[7] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israel-reportedly-strikes-syrias-latakia-port-targeting-assad-regimes-naval-assets/
[8] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/reports-claim-israeli-tanks-crossing-into-syria-buffer-zone/
[9] https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-troops-will-stay-in-syria-buffer-zone-and-strategic-mount-hermon-as-long-as-needed/
[10] https://jusoor.co/storage/posts/old-pdf/1300.pdf
[11] https://m.censor.net/en/news/3524242/how-many-russian-troops-were-in-syria
[12] https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-troops-syria-bases-tartus-khmeimim-bashar-assad-ships-2024-12
[13] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41074830
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