The ongoing Iran war has caused the fragile ceasefire in Yemen to collapse, renewing the civil war. The fighting sees both parties in the war on the offensive, but on different fronts. The Iran-friendly Houthis, already engaged in a campaign of trade-blocking in the Red Sea, is fighting the Saudi-backed government in the south. The Yemeni civil war has long been a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but the war is now merging into the Iran war as a whole, and increasingly direct confrontation between the two regional powers.
Contents:
- Background in brief
- How the sides compare
- The Houthi offensive
- The government offensive
- Saudi bombing
- Predictions
Background in brief
The Houthis are a tribe from the Shia minority living in the Yemeni highlands. The movement commonly referred to as Houthis is the party Ansar Allah (party of god) founded by Hussein al-Houthi, led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and where the Houthi tribe plays a leading role. In 2004 the Houthi rebellion began after a conflict with the central government.[1] Hussein was killed, and his brother Abdul-Malik, who still leads Ansar Allah, took over. The Houthi rebellion was contained to the countryside in northern Yemen for ten years.
In 2011 Yemen had an ailing economy and divided politics, and Abdullah Saleh, president since 1990, was turning unpopular. In 2012 he resigned and gave power to his vice president Abdrabbuh Hadi, who did not manage to save the political state of the country. In 2014, after two years of Hadi’s unpopular rule, the two crises merged. Saleh allied himself with the Houthis, who captured the capital of Sana’a, beginning the Yemeni civil war. Hadi moved his government to Aden, and a Saudi-Arabian-led intervention in 2015 saved the Hadi government from losing Aden and the war.
After 2015, the Yemeni civil war settled into a military stalemate. The Houthis controlled the Yemeni highlands, and the government ruled the southern lowlands and the eastern desert. A costly and deadly Saudi intervention was countered by military aid from Iran to the Houthis, in the shape of missiles, drones, and recipies to build more of both. In 2017, Saleh declared his break from the Houthis in a televised adress, and was promptly killed two days later. In 2018, the UAE decided to back a movement that wants separation between North and South Yemen, which continued to work with the Hadi government in an uneasy alliance.
A massive, deadly and tragically inconclusive Houthi offensive against the city of Marib in 2021-2022 confirmed that the stalemate was a fact, and a ceasefire was called on April 1st, 2022. With some small exceptions, the stalemate between the two main sides held until this month. The Houthis have spent the ceasefire period attacking trade in the Red Sea to harm Israel, fighting the US and UK in the process. The southern government has spent the ceasefire period nervously split between the Saudi-backed unity forces, and the UAE-backed southern independence forces. They came to blows last December, which ended with the southern independence forces disbanded and the UAE leaving Yemen for good.
How the sides compare
The exact armed strength of both the Houthi and government forces is unknown, but it is generally agreed the Houthis have more soldiers. The Houthis hold more of Yemen’s population, and draw upon broad popular mobilization. The Houthis are lacking in conventional advanced weaponry like an air force or armored forces, but make up for it by using missiles built after Iranian recipes or transported from Iran.
The government forces have fewer soldiers, but have more heavy weaponry. This has not proven decisive, however, and the government forces are consistently reliant on Saudi Arabian air support and sometimes ground support to make gains. The government forces also rely on the support of local militias in some regions to make up for lacking manpower in the army. Without foreign support, Houthis hold the advantage.
The Southern Houthi offensive
The Houthis were already trying to disrupt trade in the Red Sea, but they were a bit far away from the Bab al-Mandab strait to disrupt it properly. The land areas closest to the strait were held by government forces. On September 3rd, the Houthis launched an offensive in the south, along the Red Sea coast. Rapid gains were met by rapid counterattacks by the southern government, and the deputy defense minister declared that they were planning to retake Sana’a.[2] Government forces advanced quickly into Houthi-held territory for a week, until the Houthi counter-counteroffensive began.[3] Throughout September 10th and 11th, the Houthis have captured the entire Red Sea coast and all Red Sea islands of Yemen.[4] Helping the Houthis is that the remnants of the southern independence forces, who were defeated in January, have been attacking government forces in the south.[5]
It remains to be seen what the impacts of this will be, or if the Houthis will keep the captured territory for long. Immediate effects of the territorial gains is that the Houthis have a better position than before to disrupt trade, and that they have almost cut off the city of Taiz from supply. Taiz is the third largest city of Yemen, and the second largest held by the southern government. If it falls, only lowland villages lie between the provisional capital of Aden and the Houthis.
The Eastern Government Offensive
Back when the Yemeni government was optimistic about victory against the Houthis, that is, about a week ago, they launched an offensive from the city of Marib into the uplands of the city. The offensive cannot be compared to the southern offensives in speed, but an expansion of government control around the city can help guard it from later Houthi attacks, which is an important goal of the southern government.[6] The merit of attacking into defensive highlands from a defensive city while floundering on other fronts is debateable, however. It is doubtful this front will be decisive in the coming days and weeks.
The Saudi Bombing, and the Bombing of Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has renewed its bombing campaign against the Houthis to support the southern government. The bombing has struck advancing Houthi forces, and areas that the Houthis have just captured, to deprive them of strategic value.[7] If the momentum of the Houthis continues to hold, the Saudis may be forced to choose between a more decisive intervention and losing their ally in Yemen. The Saudi crown prince has reportedly asked the US to help intervene, and been declined.[8] In 2015, Aden was saved by a deployment of Saudi ground forces, but it was costly. By 2018, Saudi Arabia had suffered more than 1000 dead in Yemen,[9] and this may leave the Saudis hesitant to commit to such an operation again.
The Houthis have responded to the Saudi bombing by bombing Saudi Arabia with ground based missiles. Satellite imagery shows damage to the Saudi East-West oil pipeline, which is the main Saudi backup solution to the Hormuz export route.[10] Saudi Arabian air defenses were already under strain due to attacks from Iran, and reprisals from the Houthis provide another reason for the Saudis to restrict their involvement in Yemen.
Predictions for the near future
As far as I can tell, there are three likely ends to these offensives. The first option is that the Houthis are content with taking the Red Sea coast, or that the offensive stalls. In this case, Saudi intervention may be avoided, and a renewed period of stalemate will ensue. Whether this happens is entirely dependent on how the fighting goes the coming days. If the government forces continue to collapse and the Houthis see the opportunity to take Aden, they will prioritize that over the Red Sea campaign. If the government stabilizes, the Houthis will likely be content with their gains so far.
The second option is that Taiz falls, followed by Aden, and the Yemeni government either dissolves or is reduced to a rump state in the eastern desert. If this occurs, the Houthis will have a freer hand in the Red Sea, but will also be less dependent on Iranian support, and may also be more focused on ruling their reunited country. This option depends on the Houthis keeping up the momentum they have right now.
The third option is that the Saudis choose to intervene with ground forces, possibly with US air support. This option would essentially ensure the survival of the southern government, but would also bind up large Saudi forces. I don’t believe the Houthis would collapse even with direct intervention, considering their high soldier numbers and broad popular support, but the extent and stability of such support is hard to gauge. No matter what end this offensive has, the dynamics in Yemen won’t return to the status they had during the ceasefire period.
Sources
[1] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/yemens-forever-war-houthi-rebellion
[2] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-government-says-decision-has-been-made-to-retake-sanaa-from-houthis/4050196
[3] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/6/how-significant-are-the-yemeni-governments-military-gains-against-the-houthis
[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c23x72yx2rvo
[5] https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=5719
[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/10/houthis-yemeni-forces-engaged-in-fierce-battles-why-each-front-matters
[7] https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/saudi-strikes-yemen-mokha-airport-houthis-island-9.7339979
[8] https://www.axios.com/2026/09/11/houthis-yemen-saudi-trump-mbs-strikes
[9] https://www.aljazeera.com/video/2018/5/28/more-than-1000-saudi-troops-killed-in-yemen-since-war-began
[10] https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabias-east-west-oil-pipeline-hit-by-houthis-photos-appear-to-show-12430311
Leave a Reply