In recent years there has been a discussion on what the future holds for large surface warships. The performance of the major navies involved in current conflicts are seen by some as surprisingly weak or disappointing, while new developments in offensive weaponry mean naval forces need to engage with a different threat environment from just ten years ago. The recent developments have led some to claim, in the most extreme case, that surface naval forces are already outdated.[1] The claim that surface forces are outdated is fringe among those with any knowledge on the topic, who usually hold that surface combatants either are struggling and approaching obsolescence,[2] or that they are struggling now, but need reform and technological innovation to maintain relevance.[3]
This article will assume some knowledge on basic naval terminology. The previous blog post is a list and explanation of such terminology, which I’d recommend checking out if you feel lost or curious through reading this one.
Introduction
There is always a race within military technological development between offensive and defensive technologies, and with the rapid development of kamikaze drones the ability for ground forces to target naval forces has improved faster than the air-defense technologies on board warships. For the purposes of this article, I will consider a “recent development” to be a technological innovation since roughly 2020, when the first true drone war (between Armenia and Azerbaijan) was fought.
As is attributed to admiral Horatio Nelson, “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort”. If the ability for ground forces to engage naval forces cost-effectively meant that naval forces were obsolete, then we would have stopped building warships centuries ago. Sufficiently prepared ground forces will always hold an advantage over naval forces from far away. Ground forces have the opportunity to fortify themselves in the terrain and are closer to resupply. In addition, when a ground-based missile battery or radar station is hit, only that installation is destroyed. If a warship sinks, it brings all the expensive kit and weaponry on board with it. Naval planners know this, and will not bring their forces into a disadvantageous position for no reason. The US navy has deployed warships in the Red Sea to protect trade, where they know they can defend themselves against Houthi attacks, but have not deployed naval forces in the Persian Gulf, where Iran has planned for a war with the US for decades.
For surface warships to be obsolete, ground forces need to very easily and consistently make it impossible for an enemy force to be stationed outside their coasts. If drone swarms and missiles make it impossible for naval forces to operate hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away from the coasts, that would make the utility of surface ships more dubious. If drone and missile forces are cheap enough that ground forces can force naval forces away in any context, or a better alternative for power projection emerges, then surface warships would be obsolete.
In this article I will primarily make the case for major surface combatants, “major” being frigate-sized and up, and that they will maintain the ability to defend themselves, and therefore have a role in future wars and in future geopolitics. Major surface combatants carry out sea control, power projection and defense of aircraft carriers, all of which hinge on their ability to maintain functional air defense for themselves and surrounding vessels. I will not discuss the viability of minor surface combatants, those being corvettes and fast attack craft, nor the viability of submarines or aircraft carriers (though of course, aircraft carrier defense partly relies on surface combatants).
In the warship debate, I place myself squarely in the camp that believes warships will regain a relative defensive advantage with coming technologies, and aren’t anywhere close to being obsolete. I will present why I believe the impact of the new offensive technologies are, as of now, overstated, and how I believe the dynamic between ship attack and ship defense will look in ten years’ time.
Read what others think about naval forces:
- [1] https://johnquigginblog.substack.com/p/navies-are-obsolete
- [2] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/big-us-navy-warships-did-drones-and-missiles-just-make-them-obsolete-210348
- [3] https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/07/every-navys-biggest-fear-their-entire-fleet-could-soon-become-as-obsolete-as-a-battleship/
The old “threat environment”
When discussing surface warship viability, there are two main categories of threats that worry analysts. The first is anti-ship cruise missiles fired by airplanes, ground forces, or other warships, which I will call the “high” threat, and the second is the underwater danger from submarines and mines, which I will call the “low” threat. Combined, they make up what is called the “threat environment”, the sum of dangers that surface warships need to contend with.
The “high” argument essentially goes that, in a modern environment, a surface warship will be easily spotted, its air defenses will be saturated by cheap drones and missiles, and they will be easily destroyed or sunk by modern anti-ship cruise missiles. Within this line of reasoning, only the second part, that of air defenses being saturated, is actually a new development. French-made air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles were used by Argentina with some success during the Falklands war in 1982. The threat of cruise missiles, while often presented as part of the new threat environment, is not new.
The first part of the equation, that warships are spotted easily, is only partly true. Warships are easy to pinpoint at a single point in time by satellite, but they are moving targets and may be somewhere else entirely by the time the drones or missiles of an adversary actually reach them. Real time radar spotting of warships by other warships or by airplanes has not gotten any easier in recent years, and will even be harder when up against stealth warship designs of some modern navies. A cruise missile can radar lock onto a warship at the end of its flight path, but without knowing where a warship is when a missile arrives it will very likely end up missing entirely. The size of the oceans and relative difficulty of real-time tracking of warships remains a major defensive advantage of surface warships.
Modern naval cruise missiles can inflict heavy damage on an enemy warship if it knows where that warship is, but it also requires getting past the warship’s air defenses. A modern major surface combatant will usually carry a number of surface-air missiles (SAMs) for long or medium range air defense for its entire squadron, and have a few units of close-in weapons systems (CIWS) for attacks that get too close. A prepared surface combatant will usually be able to stop an attack from an incoming missile. Suppose a warship is unprepared, overwhelmed, unlucky, or lacking in ammunition, however, and it will risk a direct hit.
In addition to the threat of missiles above the water, surface warships need to contend with the danger of submarines and mines below the surface. The contest between submarines and surface warships is mostly dependent on which vessel can spot the other first using sonar, and this has again not fundamentally changed with any recent development. The threat of sea mines is mostly an issue for warships that move into mined areas unknowingly and without mine countermeasures support. The development in sea drones adds a new “low” threat.
The “new” threat environment
The threats to warships described above have been developing for decades, but the abilities of warships to counter them have improved in parallel. For the role of surface warships to be substantially diminished, the new threats would need to advance faster than the means warships have to defend themselves. The new “high” challenge is the threat of drone swarms cost-efficiently expending the air defenses of a warship. The worry is two-fold, both that drone swarms allow a ground-based attacker to make the naval forces waste money, and the other that drone swarms will force the ships to use up all air defenses, leaving them vulnerable to missiles. The new “low” challenge is the threat of surface and underwater drones.
The new “high” threats
The conflict in the Red Sea has been where drone swarms have been the most relevant. The price of a Shahed-136 kamikaze drone is usually estimated to be in the range of $20,000-50,000, but I have found novel estimates moving the price down to $7,000[1] or up to $70,000.[2] Regardless of the Shahed’s cost, it is less than the price of a RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missile, which is at $165,000 apiece the cheapest interceptor missile found on US warships.[3] The Evolved Seas Sparrow Missile costs reportedly at least $787,000 apiece, somewhat closer to the popular conception of million dollar missile used on $20,000 drone. More expensive and costly interceptors have been reported used against both Houthi and Iranian attacks, but they have likely been used mostly to defend against anti-ship missiles.
Drones, which are relatively slow-moving and therefore easy to shoot down do not usually need the use of costly interceptors to stop. Helping the US navy in the Red Sea stay afloat is the use of less complex means to counter Houthi drone attacks, by using CIWS, deck guns and helicopters.[4] The Phalanx CIWS, costing “only” $3500 per second to fire, may even be cheaper than the Shahed drone it shoots down.[5] When using naval gunnery instead of naval missiles to counter drones, the cost difference is a smaller issue.
When warships need to defend against drones at a longer range, for example to defend shipping or support ships within their task force, interceptors may still need to be used. The same goes for situations where a drone attack is sufficiently large that letting the entire swarm reach CIWS range would risk a direct hit. In those contexts, the limits of interceptor numbers are a problem. The first issue linked to interceptor numbers is an operational one, namely that warships still need to return to port to reload their VLS missiles. If an adversary can force the use of enough interceptors, they can also force a warship out of a sea zone temporarily. The second is a strategic issue, which is that production of sufficient numbers of interceptor missiles has proved difficult in modern warfare.
The hypothetical tactical issue of a warship running out of interceptors and being struck by numbers of drones, however, has not happened. Neither has the hypothetical of a drone slipping through the air defenses of a warship due to the sheer numbers of the attacks. The only major surface combatant known to have been struck by flying drones is the Russian frigate Admiral Essen, which was in port at the time.[6] While in port, she was likely unmanned and with deactivated air defenses, with the expectation that ground-based air defenses would protect her. Her sister ship, the Admiral Makarov, may have been struck together with Essen in a later attack.
A possible reason that no warships have been struck at sea by flying drones yet is that the hypothesized drone swarms remain to be seen. By some combination of lacking detection, lack of nearby drone launchers and lack of organizational cohesion, neither Ukraine nor the Houthis have launched enough drones that they could overwhelm a warship. Drones keep improving in range, speed, autonomous detection, and so on, and launcher groups from Russia, Ukraine and Iran are already capable of synchronizing overland swarms. If, or when, launching drone swarms at moving warships becomes viable, it may be possible to overwhelm the air defenses of isolated ships, provided little defensive technological improvement happens.
The new “low” threats
Russia has lost a greater number of ships to sea drones than to flying drones, but still no major surface combatants. Most of the ships lost by Russia are also support ships with little ability to defend themselves, and many of the ones hit were in port. Only one instance of a surface warship being struck by naval drones while at operational readiness is known, that being the Russian corvette Ivanovets. The attack was filmed and the ship can be seen attempting to fire at the attacking naval drones to little effect. Eventually three of the six drones engaged hit it, and the ship was sunk.[7] The Ivanovets was caught in open waters by more maneuverable drones entirely without support. The attack proves that naval drones, given the right circumstances, can defeat a surface warship on their own, if only a minor surface combatant for now.
Underwater drones are less maneuverable than surface drones, but harder to detect. Until now they have only been used in port strikes by Ukraine, but in time they may prove a greater threat to surface warships than surface drones do currently. Traditionally, surface ships have been dependent on “soft-kill” measures against torpedoes, meaning systems that make the drone miss by making it lose focus, usually by offering up a dummy target. A manually or AI-controlled underwater drone can change course in spite of soft-kill countermeasures, leaving a warship with little recourse.
Sources:
- [1] https://phenomenalworld.org/analysis/cost-of-a-shahed/
- [2] https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/shahed_136_really_cost_20_50k_iran_sold_them_to_russia_for_200_300k_in_2022_actual_price_far_higher-17764.html
- [3] https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems/u-s-deployed-intercept-systems/sea-sparrow-missile/
- [4] https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/01/15/navys-fight-red-sea-used-220-missiles-officials-say-thats-changing.html
- [5] https://www.twz.com/sea/phalanx-ciws-costs-3500-per-second-in-ammo-to-fire
- [6] https://www.kyivpost.com/post/71311
- [7] https://www.svoboda.org/a/kto-prozhivaet-na-dne-okeana-ataka-na-raketnyy-kater-ivanovets-/32802691.html (in Russian)
Future surface fleets
Put together, the use of flying and naval drones mean more risk and cost in operating warships, but nothing that can force them out of the water yet. The development of drone technology is sure to continue, but assuming that drones will improve past where they are now and ship defenses won’t would be naïve. In this section, I will present six solutions I have found that are currently in development or beginning of deployment that will move the offense-defense balance more in favor of warship defense.
These six technological solutions are:
1. Cheaper interceptor missiles
2. On-sea reloading of VLS missiles
3. Interceptor drones
4. Lasers
5. Hard-kill torpedo countermeasures
6. Manned-unmanned hybrid fleets
Solution 1: Cheaper interceptors
Military developments on land have caused interceptor numbers on a strategic level into focus, as high numbers of missile attacks have caused a strain on interceptor supply. As a result, defense suppliers all over the world are being contracted for cheap solutions for medium- to close-ranged missile defense. The air defense missiles currently being produced or developed for ground forces can easily be adapted for use by naval forces, and navies around the world will be looking for cheaper and more numerous air defense options when the survivability of their ships is brought into question.
The main issues driving up the price of interceptor missiles, aside from their technical complexity, is the lack of an economy of scale. The Israeli Iron Dome air-defense system has a cost of $40,000-50,000 per short-ranged Tamir missile.[1] A naval version of the system, the C-dome, was launched in 2024. Israel has long been the only country that has been actively using air defense missiles, and therefore the only one with an adequate economy of scale. Real needs of war have pushed more countries to develop independent or joint production of short and medium ranged air defense missiles. Production lines take time to ramp up, but in a few years’ time the use of interceptor missiles on warships will likely be a lot cheaper and less vulnerable to supply issues.
Solution 2: On-sea reloading of VLS missiles
The operational issue of missile shortages, that warships need to reload in port, and may be forced out of a sea zone by sustained attacks, can be solved by not needing to reload in port. The ability for warships to have their VLS cells reloaded is being developed for the US navy, and successful tests have been carried out.[2] Warships operating far from home ports usually have a fleet oiler embedded in their task force already, meaning the use of on-sea reloading won’t need any more supply ships on duty. VLS reloading systems were already being developed in the 1990s, but were cancelled more due to the lack of need for such a system than due to technical difficulties.
Solution 3: Interceptor drones
As described in the section on new threats, warships may still need to launch missiles to defend against drones targeting other ships, or against drones in too large a number for one ship’s air defenses. The use of interceptor drones can cover this middle ground. Interceptor drones are already in use by Ukraine, and development of the technology will continue to improve as drone technology in general does. The Dutch navy has already ordered batches of interceptor drones to station on their warships as a new layer of air defense between the role of surface-air missiles and CIWS.[3]
Solution 4: Lasers
Lasers (and other directed energy weapons) are being put into service as yet another close air defense solution. Lasers have two main benefits. One benefit of lasers is that they don’t require ammunition, only power. Most large warships will have gas turbine power generators on board, meaning the use of lasers will only entail increased fuel use for the ship. The other main benefit is that lasers travel at light speed, making aiming within visual range uncomplicated. If lasers prove their worth as cheaper and more accurate than CIWS gunnery, laser guns may partially replace CIWS cannons on warships.
Laser weapons sound like a future solution to a current problem, but they have already been used effectively in live-fire testing.[4] I would not be surprised if lasers have already shot down Houthi drones in the Red Sea, and the US navy is waiting to make the announcement. The US and Chinese navies already have lasers deployed, and smaller powers are likely to follow.
Solution 5: Hard-kill anti-torpedo systems
The solutions described so far have been against the “high” problems faced by warships, and have therefore offered “high”, or air defense, solutions. This does not solve the threat posed by sea drones, with underwater sea drones in particular being a worry. As described in the previous section, underwater drones are less likely to be stopped by soft-kill systems than torpedoes are. At the same time as underwater drones are entering service, anti-torpedo hard-kill systems are being developed.[5] As anti-torpedo torpedoes become common, underwater drones will be even more reliant on avoiding detection to hope to reach their target.
Solution 6: Manned-unmanned hybrid navies
The British Royal Navy has launched an ambitious plan, which is to construct a new “hybrid navy”.[6] The fundamental idea is to have large, manned warships as a core asset surrounded by smaller unmanned vessels. So far I have covered only sea drones that destroy enemy ships by ramming them and exploding, but Ukraine has developed sea drones that carry surface-air missiles, which is probably a major role of sea drones in the future.[7] The central warship will serve as mothership and command center for the surrounding unmanned vessels, that can support with extra weaponry and sensors.
The navy cannot, however, be entirely unmanned. The Ukrainian naval strategy works because it operates in coastal waters near Ukraine, where the unmanned vessels can still communicate with powerful land-based radars and command centers. Carrying out sea control and power projection away from home ports without large surface warships will leave a country with a number of unmanned boats in unfriendly seas with little means of communicating with friendly forces or detecting the enemy. Staying competitive in a wartime environment requires large sensor capability, which requires a lot of power, which requires a certain size of ship.
Sources:
[1] https://norskluftvern.com/2025/07/19/iron-dome-missile-defense-system-cost-analysis-and-performance-comparison/
[2] https://www.jhuapl.edu/work/projects-and-missions/reloading-vertical-launching-systems-sea
[3] https://www.calibredefence.co.uk/dutch-navy-destinus-hornet-b2-interceptor/
[4] https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/american-warship-downs-drones-with-laser/
[5] https://news.usni.org/2013/06/20/navy-develops-torpedo-killing-torpedo
[6] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2ky95ndx92o
[7] https://www.autonocion.com/us/39-foot-drone-boat-18-interceptors/
Future of surface warships
To sum up the developments I have found, both the abilities to attack large warships and the abilities of warships to defend themselves are improving. Until now the offense has improved more, but I believe the defensive will improve faster as new technologies mature and the production lines of current weapons will improve. The dynamic will turn into attempting to wear out and overload the sensors and ammunition stores of warships using cheap attacks, and hoping for lucky hits with faster, more expensive and advanced anti-ship missiles. To put forward a guess, I’d say that warships will appear as more vulnerable than before for a few years, but that the multiple defensive developments will make warships seem less vulnerable than before 2020 in ten years’ time.
Of course, the defensive developments won’t become ubiquitous immediately, and many navies of poorer countries will struggle to keep up with threats from flying drone swarms and naval drones. If, lasers, for instance, become a necessity in modern ship defense, hundreds of warships globally that cannot be retrofitted with lasers or where there isn’t the budget to do so will be made obsolete. This is not new, as the advent of missiles also made the large guns and thick armor of old battleships and gun cruisers obsolete, without removing or causing the obsolescence of surface combatants as a concept.
It will also take time for anti-ship drone technologies good enough to destroy “old” surface warships to become ubiquitous, those ships that are now modern. In the meantime, conflicts may be fought between countries that use both the old systems of ship attack and ship defense. India and Pakistan waged a naval war in 1971 with gun-armed frigates and destroyers, long after the age of missiles had begun. Developments in military technology are always developed and deployed unevenly, and it will not be clear until some time has passed when the new generation began.
The advent of a new generation does not mean that the large naval powers of today will necessarily remain the large naval powers of tomorrow. Large investments in warships years ago without investment being put into improving and retrofitting those same warships can leave entire countries with large navies that would be powerful in 2020, but in 2030 or 2040 are entirely useless in a conflict with a modern opponent. The navies of those countries that can keep up with technological developments, however, will be just as viable as naval power has been for centuries.
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